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Optimal allotment policy in central bank open market operations
Abstract
This paper derives a central bank's optimal liquidity supply towards a money market with an
unrestricted lending facility. We show that when the effect of liquidity on market rates is not too small,
and the monetary authority cares for both interest rates and liquidity conditions, then the optimal
allotment policy may entail a discontinuous reaction to initial conditions. In particular, the model
predicts a threshold level of liquidity below which the central bank will not bail out the banking system.
An estimation of the liquidity effect for the euro area suggests that the discontinuity might have
contributed to the Eurosystem's tight response to occurrences of underbidding during the period June
2000 through March 2004.
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1 Introduction
The topic of monetary policy implementation, i.e., the issue of how a central bank 
implements its monetary decisions, has recently attracted significant interest by both 
central bankers and academic researchers. The aim of the present paper is to contribute 
to the understanding of monetary policy implementation, especially concerning the 
mechanics that link the decisions of the monetary authority and the behavior of short-
term interest rates in the interbank market. To this aim, we propose a simple model that 
captures some of the institutional aspects of present-day operational frameworks, where 
we focus on the active role of the central bank as a provider of liquidity to the banking 
system. 
Our analytic framework builds upon Woodford's (2003) basic model according 
to which the central bank determines the level of market interest rates essentially by 
positioning an interest rate corridor the upper boundary of which is defined through the 
rate applied in a standing lending facility. Changes in policy rates are implemented by 
moving the corridor up or down. Within the interest rate corridor, supposing it is 
sufficiently wide as in the cases of the Federal Reserve or the Eurosystem, there is some 
scope for market rates to vary on a daily basis. Within the corridor, interest rates may be 
steered indirectly by providing more or less liquidity to the market. Changes to the 
market rate result then in particular from the so-called end-of-period liquidity effect 
(Hamilton 1997), that summarizes the response of the market to expectations 
concerning tighter or looser liquidity conditions at the end of the reserve accounting 
period. E.g., if the rate for overnight interbank loans appears to be too high within the 
corridor from a central bank perspective, a liquidity injection would bring a certain 
relief to market conditions, and would allow market rates to decline again to a more 
desirable level. 
A central assumption made in this paper is that the central bank wishes to 
implement its interest rate target within the corridor in a smooth manner. By this 
formulation, we mean that the monetary authority will have a preference for keeping 
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fluctuations, both in the market rate and in the central bank credit outstanding to the 
banking sector, at a minimum. This can be a plausible assumption, in particular if 
liquidity provided by the central bank in one reserve maintenance period contributes to 
the fulfillment of reserve requirements in another period, and if the central bank wishes 
to sustain the effectiveness of its regular instruments. E.g., in the case of the operational 
framework of the Eurosystem in use before March 2004, a large allotment in the last 
main refinancing operation of a reserve maintenance period would imply the subsequent 
period starting with an excessively large central bank credit. This situation, possibly 
deteriorated by a liquidity-providing shock, would dwarf the first main refinancing 
operation in the new period, meaning that the regular instruments of implementation 
would temporarily cease to ascertain an effective control over liquidity conditions in the 
interbank market. 
Our results are as follows. In the absence of imbalances, there is no trade-off 
between the criteria of interest rate and liquidity smoothing. Indeed, in this case, the 
central bank may simply inject the aggregate reserve deficit, and may thereby reach 
both interest rate and liquidity targets. However, typically, this will not be feasible. 
Instead, there will be a trade-off between interest rate and liquidity smoothing after an 
occurrence of underbidding in an individual open market operation. Here and 
elsewhere, the term underbidding refers to a situation where the total of the incoming 
bids in a central bank operation is lower than the allotment that would be necessary to 
implement the central bank's regular liquidity policy. Because in any given operation, 
the central bank can only allocate liquidity by satisfying incoming bids, the allotment is 
bound to be below the necessary amount in the case of underbidding, so that a 
temporary shortage of liquidity in the money market will be created. Bailing out the 
banking system would require an overly large allotment in the subsequent open market 
operation, which causes the trade-off between interest rate and liquidity smoothing. 
To our knowledge, the issue of an optimal policy reaction to underbidding has 
not been addressed so far in the literature. Most of the established theoretical literature 
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on the interbank market for reserves in times of regular operation, as originated by work 
of Poole (1968), Ho and Saunders (1985), Campbell (1987), Spindt and Hoffmeister 
(1988), Hamilton (1996), and others, has tended to abstract from the central bank's 
active role in the money market, with only a few recent exceptions. 
Ayuso and Repullo (2003) assume that the central bank's loss function penalizes 
market rates below the target more severely than market rates above the target. This 
induces the central bank to follow a tight allotment policy. As a consequence, 
allotments in fixed-rate tenders (where banks pay the target rate) are profitable, 
generating overbidding. However, in a variable-rate tender with pre-announced liquidity 
injection, there is a bidding equilibrium without excess demand. Bartolini, Bertola and 
Prati (2002) develop an intertemporal model of the market for Federal funds allowing 
for daily central bank intervention. Without intervention, the expected variance of the 
market rate is increasing over the reserve accounting period. With unconstrained 
intervention, however, the central bank may implement its target interest rate in all but 
the final day of the reserve accounting period. The model thereby allows a positive 
analysis of the consequences of various central bank policies on the time-series 
properties of the Federal funds rate. Bartolini, Bertola and Prati (2001) offer an 
explanation for the empirical observation that banks in the U.S. tend to hold more 
reserves on settlement days than on other days of the reserve accounting period. It is 
shown that with uncertain reserve requirements, transaction costs, and constant market 
rates, demand for reserves is higher on the second day of a two-day period than on the 
first day. While the paper does not specify an objective function for the central bank, it 
discusses informally the trade-off between a higher interest rate vis-à-vis increased 
reserves on settlement day from the central bank's perspective. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
indirect steering of interest rates via the liquidity effect and derive the liquidity target 
from the interest rate target. In Section 3, we consider allotment decisions in two 
consecutive open market operations, and derive the benchmark allotment in the first 
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operation that allows satisfying both the interest rate and the liquidity target in the 
second operation. Section 4 analyzes the optimal policy reaction to underbidding, and 
its responsiveness to changes in the initial conditions. In Section 5, we quantify the 
liquidity effect in the euro area, and evaluate the practical relevance of the identified 
discontinuity. Section 6 discusses robustness and the case of excess liquidity after the 
first operation. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix contains the proof of Proposition 4. 
Ewerhart et al. (2007) document and model manipulation of the euro money market. In 
the formal analysis, a commercial bank finds it in its best interest to sporadically 
leverage its exposure to the interbank rate by contracting in the market for overnight 
index swaps. The width of the corridor is shown to be of no consequence for either 
probability or extent of manipulation. Instead, fine-tuning operations and careful design 
of the operational framework can mitigate the problem. 
2 Steering interest rates via the liquidity effect 
We consider a single reserve accounting or maintenance period represented by the 
interval > @T;0 , where 0!T . The expected aggregate liquidity supply provided through 
central bank operations over the maintenance period will be denoted by S . Aggregate 
liquidity demand is equal to the sum of exogenous aggregate reserve requirements R
and stochastic autonomous liquidity factors A
~
. Liquidity demand is assumed to be 
perfectly inelastic. Autonomous liquidity factors realize at some time st ,
where Tts 0 . We will denote by (.)G  the cumulative distribution function 
corresponding to A
~
. Figure 1 shows the empirical distribution of autonomous factors in 
the euro area. 
- place Figure 1 about here - 
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Standing facilities offer individual banks the opportunity to borrow and lend an 
arbitrary amount overnight at the marginal lending rate Lr  and the deposit rate LD rr  ,
respectively. Clearly, in the absence of a deposit facility, we have 0 Dr . From the 
inelasticity of demand at the end of the reserve maintenance period and from the 
availability of the standing facilities, it follows that the market rate )
~
,( ASr s  prevailing 
after the realization of the autonomous factor shock A
~
 is equal to one of the corridor 
rates, depending on whether there is excess demand or excess supply at the end of that 
given period. Specifically, we have 
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Thus, in the model the market rate reaches the marginal lending rate when the aggregate 
average liquidity supply is below aggregate demand, and analogously the market rate 
drops to the deposit rate when supply exceeds demand. Hence, with reference to the 
rational expectations hypothesis, the level of the market rate within the period can be 
expressed as a weighted average of the rates of the standing facilities, where the weights 
are given by the respective probabilities that the upper and lower boundaries of the 
interest rate corridor are reached at the end of the reserve accounting period. 
Proposition 1 (Poole’s Lemma). Let S denote the central bank's aggregate liquidity 
supply expected for the maintenance period, and assume that the interest rate follows a 
martingale process. Then the market rate before time st  is given by
  DL rRSGrRSGSr )()(1)(  ,            (1) 
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where )( RSG   is the probability of ending the maintenance period with recourse to 
the deposit facility.  
Proof. See text above. Ƒ
Proposition 1 provides a link between the central bank's supply of liquidity and the 
market rate prevailing on the interbank market. E.g., if the market expects the allotment 
policy to be restrictive, or else that autonomous factors will drain the banking system 
after the last operation in a given period, then the market rate will increase above the 
mid of the corridor. Indeed, the existing experience with corridor systems suggests that 
this mechanism captures the first-order determinant for short-term money market rates. 
Derivation of the liquidity target. Proposition 1 suggests that the monetary authority, 
in order to implement its interest rate target );( LD rrr  , would have to provide for 
average liquidity conditions S  such that 
  DL rRSGrRSGr )()(1   .
Solving for S  gives the neutral average liquidity as a sum of aggregate reserve 
requirements and a percentile of the autonomous factor distribution 
¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§

 


DL
L
rr
rr
GRS 1 .              (2) 
E.g., in the case where the corridor is symmetric around the target rate, i.e., when 
2)( DL rrr   , the liquidity target would be just the sum of reserve requirements and 
the median of the autonomous factor distribution. 
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As mentioned in the introduction, we will assume that the central bank is 
interested in smooth implementation, captured by a target for the total central bank 
credit L  outstanding to the banking system. A natural candidate for L  results if the 
outstanding central bank credit is held constant over the reserve accounting period, so 
that we define 
T
S
L

  .                (3) 
Indeed, under this condition, a constant volume L  of outstanding central bank credit 
just implements the interest rate target r .
3 Benchmark allotments 
We consider now in more detail the central bank's allotment decision in the last regular 
operation of the reserve accounting period > @T;0 . We envisage a central bank that, like 
the ECB, performs regular operations that are spaced on the time axis (not daily), with 
each operation providing a significant fraction of the overall liquidity supply in the 
current period. The possibility of additional non-regular open market activities such as 
fine-tuning will be ignored. 
While in principle, there can be several regular operations providing liquidity 
during the reserve maintenance period, it will be sufficient for our purposes to model 
explicitly only the last two operations in the period, and to consider an aggregate of the 
supply through earlier operations. See Figure 2 for illustration. 
- place Figure 2 about here - 
Specifically, we consider the penultimate operation (henceforth tender A) and the last 
operation (tender B). Let At  and Bt  denote the time of tenders A and B, respectively, 
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where sBA ttt 0 . Moreover, let 0tAX  and 0tBX be the allotment volumes in 
tenders A and B, respectively, and let 0S  denote the liquidity supply for the current 
reserve maintenance period provided by operations before tender A. For specificity, we 
will assume that the liquidity allocated in tenders A and B is outstanding over the time 
intervals > @Tt A ;  and > @TtB ; , respectively, while liquidity provided in earlier operations 
matures before Bt .
Under these assumptions, the expected aggregate liquidity supply at the end of 
the period is given by 
BBAABA XtTXtTSXXSS )()(),( 0   .           (4) 
Replacing S  by S  and subsequently solving for BX  yields the allotment that 
implements the interest rate target r  as 
^ `AA
B
A
b
B XtTSS
tT
XX )(
1
)( 0 
  .            (5) 
This amount will be referred to as the benchmark allotment in tender B. With this 
allotment, the central bank implements the target interest rate r .
1
To determine the allotment necessary to implement L , note that from the 
assumptions on the time structure made above, the outstanding liquidity after tender B 
is simply the sum of the allotments made in tenders A and B, i.e., 
BABA XXXXLL   ),( .              (6) 
                                                
1 Indeed, formula (5) is a formal counterpart of the Eurosystem’s definition (see ECB 2002b). 
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Implementing the liquidity target L  requires therefore an allotment of the liquidity 
refill:
AAB XLXX  
)(1 .               (7) 
However, as the next proposition shows, this will be typically inconsistent with 
implementing the interest rate target. 
Proposition 2. The central bank can implement both the interest rate and the liquidity 
target simultaneously if and only if
)(
1
0SLt
tt
XX B
AB
b
AA 
   .             (8) 
However, if bAA XX  , then 
! LL  or ! rSr )( . Moreover, if bAA XX ! , then 
 LL or
 rSr )( .
Proof. The first assertion follows immediately from )()(1 A
b
AB XXXX   using (5), (7), 
and (3). Consider now the case bAA XX  . If )( A
b
BB XXX  , then 
! rSr )( , so that we 
are done in this case. Assume therefore that )( A
b
BB XXX t . Then 
^ `
^ `
.
)(
1
)(
1
)(
0
0



 


 


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Thus, we have ! LL . The case bAA XX !  can be treated analogously and is therefore 
omitted. Ƒ
We will refer to bAX  as the benchmark allotment in tender A. In the sequel, we will 
focus on the case where bAA XX  , and refer to this case as underbidding. Under this 
condition, the banking system has built up a red position at the time of tender B, i.e., in 
order to satisfy reserve requirements as an average over the maintenance period, the 
outstanding central bank credit after tender B must exceed L  or the interest rate will 
increase above r . Thus, following an event of underbidding, there is a trade-off 
between liquidity and interest rate smoothing. 
4 Optimal allotment 
We will impose that the central bank minimizes a weighted sum of quadratic deviations 
from interest rate and liquidity targets by choosing an optimal allotment BX  in the last 
operation. Assuming for simplicity that the central bank's allotment constraint (given by 
the total of incoming bids) is not binding in tender B, the central bank's problem has the 
form 
  22
0
)()(minarg)( 
t
  LLrSrXX
BX
AB P           (9) 
 ..ts  Equations (1), (4), (3), and (6), 
where 0!P  is the weight assigned by the central bank to the liquidity target. This 
problem asks for the optimal point on the feasibility curve, i.e., the set of combinations 
of quadratic interest rate and liquidity deviations that result from feasible allotments in 
tender B. The involved trade-off is that a lower BX  leads to an increased market rate, 
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while the outstanding liquidity is lowered. The next proposition gives a range for the 
optimal allotment in tender B, after an occurrence of underbidding in tender A. 
Proposition 3. Assume that bAA XX  . Then )()(
1
A
b
BAB XXXX  , and the optimal 
allotment )( AB XX
  lies in the open interval  )();(1 AbBAB XXXX .
Proof. By Proposition 2, if bAA XX  , and 
d LXX BA , we must have that 
! rSr )( , 
and therefore )( A
b
BB XXX  . Replacing BX  by )(
1
AB XX  yields the first assertion. 
Consider now the necessary first order conditions for an optimal allotment )( AB XX
 ,
which reads 
  0)()()()('    LLtTrSrSr B P ,          (10) 
where  )(, ABA XXXSS  . By Proposition 1, we have 0)(' Sr . To provoke a 
contradiction, assume that )()( A
b
BAB XXXX t
 . But then d rSr )( . From Proposition 
2, in the case of underbidding, we must therefore have    ! LXXXLL ABA )(, . 
However, this contradicts (10), proving )()( A
b
BAB XXXX 
 . Similarly, if 
AAB XLXX d
 )( , then d LL . By Proposition 2, this implies ! rSr )( , 
contradicting (10). This proves )()( 1 ABAB XXXX !
 , and thereby the proposition. Ƒ
Thus, the optimal allotment lies between two focal allotment sizes. The first is the 
benchmark amount, i.e., the allotment that ends the maintenance period with an average 
liquidity position that allows banks to satisfy reserve requirements in a regular way. 
With this allotment, the interest rate target  rr  is met, but the outstanding central 
bank credit will exceed the target L . The second focal allotment size is the liquidity 
refill that matches the target  LL  for the outstanding central bank credit. This 
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allotment is too small to establish neutral conditions at the end of the period, forcing 
interest rates to increase above the target r .
What is the shape of the feasibility curve between these two points? To answer 
this question, note that the first-order Taylor expansion of the right-hand side of 
equation (1) with respect to S  around S  reads 
 )()(  | SSrSr U ,
where
))((' DL rrRSG  U             (11) 
is a measure of the end-of-period liquidity effect for small variations in S . Proposition 
3 tells us that     SXXXS ABA )(,  after an occurrence of underbidding. If we lower 
BX  from the benchmark allotment, this increases the interest rate, and lowers the 
outstanding credit. In a neighborhood of the benchmark allotment, the monetary 
authority therefore faces a linear trade-off between interest rate and liquidity smoothing. 
Ignoring higher-order effects for the moment, this trade-off translates into a convex 
feasibility set in the plane of quadratic deviations by a change of variables. In fact, in 
the neighborhood of the benchmark allotment, the feasibility set has locally the shape of 
a parabola. 
For allotments that are significantly below the benchmark allotment, however, the 
central bank's lending facility puts an upper bound on the quadratic deviation from the 
interest rate target. Indeed, since the tails of the distribution of the autonomous liquidity 
factors must eventually diminish, the feasibility curve, for small and declining values of 
BX , will bend backwards and become concave. Figure 3 shows the shape of the 
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feasibility curve for an example where the target rate lies in the center of the corridor, 
i.e., 2)( DL rrr   , the autonomous factor distribution is normal, 
- place Figure 3 about here - 
and the underbidding has been sufficiently pronounced. Clearly, if the underbidding is 
very mild, so that even the liquidity-neutral allotment would not cause the market rate to 
approach the marginal lending rate, then the trade-off between liquidity and interest-rate 
smoothing is convex, and an interior solution is optimal. 
The two curves in Figure 3 represent the set of possible combinations of 
quadratic deviations from the liquidity and interest rate target for two specific sets of 
initial conditions. The straight lines represent the central bank's indifference curves. 
Focus for the moment on the left hand curve, marked by the phrase "weaker 
underbidding." It can be seen from the illustration that in this case, the optimal 
allotment is slightly smaller than the benchmark allotment in this example. However, 
the feasibility curve is concave for intermediate values of BX , suggesting the 
possibility of a discontinuous central bank reaction to smoothly changing parameters. In 
fact, we can show that a discontinuity is quite typical if the liquidity effect is not too 
small. 
Proposition 4. Assume that 0!P  is not too small. Then there is a threshold level 
);0( bAA XX 
 , such that for any sufficiently small 0!H , there is a parameter 0!AV ,
such that for all autonomous factor distributions (.)G  with standard deviation 
d AA VV , the optimal allotment )( AB XX
  lies in the interval  )(;)( AbBAbB XXXX H
for H! AA XX , and in the interval  H)();( 11 ABAB XXXX  for H AA XX .
Proof. See the Appendix. Ƒ
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The possibility of a discontinuous central bank reaction is illustrated in the second curve 
that corresponds to a set-up with a slightly more pronounced underbidding. Here, the 
optimal allotment is the very close to the liquidity refill. The rationale for this 
possibility is that if the volume of tender A has been insufficient, and tender B is close 
to the end of the period, then the benchmark allotment would be very large. Injecting 
the benchmark allotment would therefore imply an outstanding central bank credit 
temporarily much larger than the target. On the other hand, once the allotment is chosen 
to be tight, there will be essentially no further deviation from the interest rate target by a 
somewhat tighter allotment. As a consequence, the feasibility curve is concave for 
intermediate allotment volumes, and it may be optimal to allocate only the amount that 
aligns the aggregate outstanding central bank credit with the target level. 
5 Estimation of the liquidity effect 
As a validation of the practical relevance of Proposition 4, we will now estimate the size 
of the liquidity effect for the case of the euro area. The method of estimation is indirect, 
and relies on results obtained in Section 2. Indeed, by Proposition 1, the impact of a 
liquidity injection on the market rate is just a linear transformation of the cumulative 
distribution function (.)G  of autonomous liquidity factors. It is therefore sufficient for 
our purposes to estimate (.)G .
The data set used comprises daily realizations of aggregate autonomous liquidity 
factors in the euro area, as well as certain forecasts on these figures that have been 
published by the ECB since the end of June 2000. The data has been taken from 
material made available by the ECB in the forefront of the January 2005 workshop on 
monetary policy implementation in the euro area. The data covers altogether 43 
maintenance periods, the first of which ended July 23, 2000, and the last of which ended 
January 23, 2004. 
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For every reserve maintenance period 43,...,1 m , we have calculated the 
unanticipated component of the changes to autonomous liquidity factors, in the sequel 
referred to as the autonomous factor shock, as follows: Let )(dA  denote autonomous 
liquidity factors at calendar date d . Denote by )(0 md  the date of the announcement of 
the last main refinancing operation in maintenance period m , and by )(1 md  the date of 
the last day in period m . Moreover, let )(mA f  denote the forecasted average of the 
autonomous liquidity factors over the period )(0 md  through )(1 md , as published by 
the ECB at date )(0 md . Then the autonomous factor shock at the end of period m  is 
defined as 
^ `¦
 
 
)(
)(
1
0
)()()(
md
mdd
f mAdAmB .
We found that the mean of the historical distribution of the variable )(mB  over the 
considered period is 1.0 B  bn euro days, and that its standard deviation is 8.8 BV
bn euro days. 
Assuming a normally distributed distribution, the liquidity effect can be 
quantified via equation (11) in a one-dimensional figure of 0.9|U  basis points per bn 
euro days. It should be noted, though, that our estimation is based on the assumption 
that the liquidity situation is perfectly observable for market participants. In reality, the 
effect of a liquidity imbalance in the market should be smaller than this figure due to 
imperfect information about autonomous liquidity factors (cf. Ewerhart et al. 2004). 
Indeed, using an alternative approach that estimates the spread between the interbank 
deposit rate index EONIA and the mid of the interest rate corridor as a function of a 
large vector of observables, Wurtz (2003) finds a value of about half the size of our 
estimate. 
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A numerical example. We have used the above estimation result to calculate two 
feasibility curves numerically (cf. Figure 3). In both scenarios, the parameters have been 
fixed as follows: 
195.07.0
99120
%75.5%75.4%75.3
0
   
  
   
Ttt
SR
rrr
BA
LD
The distribution of autonomous factors was assumed to be normal with mean zero and 
standard deviation 303.0 BV|  days. In the first scenario ("weaker underbidding"), we 
assumed 51 AX , in the second ("stronger underbidding") 50 AX . As the figure 
suggests, with weaker underbidding, the optimal allotment is the regular benchmark 
amount, whereas with stronger underbidding, it is only the liquidity refill. To check the 
robustness of our predictions with respect to potential estimation errors, we have 
repeated the computation for a doubled standard deviation (corresponding to a smaller 
liquidity effect), with no qualitative changes in the results. 
6 Extensions 
Overlapping operations. The model employed in the formal analysis relies on the 
assumption that operations do not hang over into the subsequent maintenance period. 
Taking account of the effects of the allotment policy on liquidity and interest rate 
smoothing in the subsequent period leads to an infinite-horizon set-up with discounting 
as expressed by the central bank objective function 
^ `³
f   
0
0 22 )()(ˆ
t
tt
tt
dtLLrrU PG ,
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where 0t  is the time of the last tender in the prevailing maintenance period, the 
parameters tr  and tL  denote the interest rate and the outstanding central bank credit at 
time t , and )1;0(G  is the discount factor. In the working paper version (Ewerhart et 
al. 2003), we calculate numerically the optimal intertemporal allotment policy in a set-
up with four overlapping operations per period and a linear approximation of the 
liquidity effect. It turns out that the shape of the feasibility curve does not differ 
significantly from our prediction in the one-period model. 
The intuitive reason for the robustness is that the central bank will optimally 
reduce much of the imbalance with the first operation in the subsequent reserve 
maintenance period. As a consequence, the effect of the liquidity imbalance on the 
interest rate in the subsequent period is very small, and the effect on the outstanding 
liquidity is essentially restricted to the time before the first operation in the subsequent 
period. Thus, in a first-order approximation, the infinite-horizon set-up reduces to a one-
period problem with a modified weight on the liquidity deviation, as given by 
BA
B
tt
t


 
'1
1
ˆ PP ,
where At '  denotes the time of the first open market operation in the subsequent period. 
As a consequence, the theoretical predictions remain unaffected by considering an 
infinite-horizon set-up. In fact, in the case of the euro area, the propagation of the 
liquidity imbalance beyond the second open market operation of the subsequent reserve 
maintenance period was effectively made impossible by the use of so-called split 
operations (see ECB 2003). 
Excess liquidity. A variation of the one-period model occurs if there is excess liquidity 
before tender B. In the model, the case bAA XX !  corresponds to an interpretation 
where the monetary authority has decided to allot in tender A more than the benchmark 
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amount. Alternatively, a liquidity-providing shock might have occurred between tenders 
A and B. There are again two focal allotment sizes. The first is obviously the 
benchmark amount )( A
b
B XX , that guarantees that the overall liquidity position at the 
end of the maintenance period is such that the market rate reaches both the marginal 
lending and the deposit rate with equal probability. The benchmark would typically be 
small in this scenario. 
The second focal allotment )(1 AB XX , which is larger in this scenario, is the one 
that generates, from the settlement day of tender B onwards, an outstanding central bank 
credit that corresponds to the target L . Allotting the liquidity refill means here to flood 
the market with liquidity, so that the market rate would drop to the deposit rate. One can 
show that the shape of the feasibility curve is very similar to the underbidding case. 
Also in this case, the monetary authority faces a non-convex trade-off between liquidity 
and interest rate smoothing. Thus, if the imbalance is sufficiently strong, it may become 
optimal for the central bank to depart from the benchmark in tender B. However, in 
contrast to the scenario of an undersized tender A, the theoretically optimal allotment 
may not be feasible due to insufficient demand. 
7 Conclusion 
On several occasions during the period June 2000 through March 2004, the Eurosystem 
experienced underbidding in its liquidity-providing open market operations, implying a 
temporary tightness in the euro money market. While the demand in the subsequent 
operation was typically very strong, the European Central Bank regularly did not decide 
to fully alleviate the liquidity shortage, causing short-term interest rates to rise 
significantly above the main policy rate. In this paper, we have derived the optimal 
allotment in response to underbidding in a model that captures some of the institutional 
features of the Eurosystem's operational framework for monetary policy 
implementation. 
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The formal analysis suggests that, somewhat surprisingly, creating a substantial 
monetary tightness at the end of the maintenance period after an occurrence of 
underbidding may be consistent with pursuing an optimal allotment policy. In fact, we 
showed that there is a threshold band for the accumulated aggregate liquidity position in 
the banking system at the last open market operation in a given maintenance period, so 
that the benchmark allotment is optimal whenever liquidity conditions are above the 
threshold, and a tight allotment is optimal whenever liquidity conditions are below the 
threshold. This provides a possible explanation for the Eurosystem's recurring and 
significant deviations from the benchmark allotment rule following occurrences of 
significant underbidding.
2
The analysis may also provide a rationale for changes of the operational 
framework implemented by the ECB in March 2004. The new framework relies on non-
overlapping transactions with a maturity of one week only. Transactions do also not 
hang over into the subsequent period, and the Governing Council confines itself to 
making policy decisions only at the beginning of maintenance periods. With the new 
scheme, interest rate expectations should not affect the overnight rate in the current 
maintenance period, so that underbidding should be much less likely under the new 
regime. In this sense, the recently implemented changes to the operational framework 
would make the discontinuous reaction to unbalanced liquidity conditions less often 
necessary, and would therefore allow commercial banks to satisfy their reserve 
requirements in a smoother way than before March 2004.
3
                                                
2 An alternative explanation for the ECB's reluctance to bail out the banking system after an occurrence of 
underbidding is that the increased rates at the end of the period should make underbidding unprofitable. 
However, this argument should properly be valid only for the initial episodes of underbidding. It was 
realized soon that, unexpectedly, the two-week swap rate continued to fall below the minimum bid rate on 
the day of a critical operation, despite the substantial threat (see Table I in ECB 2003). Proposition 4 
suggests an explanation that is independent of reputation effects. 
3 It is fair to say that the liquidity turmoil that began in August 2007 and has not come to an end at the 
time of final changes to this manuscript (November 2008) has influenced our views on optimal central 
bank liquidity policy. The market environment during the turmoil has so far been one of credit rationing 
and moral hazard. This invalidates the intuition underlying Poole’s Lemma, but not the trade-off between 
liquidity and interest-rate smoothing. Indeed, the first thing to note is that with frictions in the money 
market, the central bank’s liquidity target may increase strongly above the level identified in Section 2 for 
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Appendix. Proof of Proposition 4. 
In the sequel, we will use the notation 
    22 ),(),(),(   LXXLrXXSrXXD BABABA P
for the weighted sum of the deviations from the central bank's interest rate and liquidity 
targets. The proof proceeds in six steps. 
Step 1. Choose AX  such that 
  2)()(,   rrXXXD LAbBA .           (12) 
In Figure 3, this allotment corresponds to the intersection of the abscissa with an 
indifference curve through the point  2)(;0  rr L , which is located just above the 
point corresponding to the liquidity refill. We claim that, if ȝ is not too small, then such 
an );0( bAA XX 
  exists. To see why, we consider allotments 0 AX  and 
b
AA XX   in 
the sequel. Note that 
                                                                                                                               
the case of a frictionless market. This is because, with frictions, commercial banks may not have the 
incentives to exchange liquidity as quickly as needed, so a much larger stock of liquidity in the market is 
necessary. At the same time, and this is the second thing to note, the objective function of the central bank 
changes. The liquidity situation becomes much more important for the central bank during the turmoil 
than the expected interest rate at the final day of the maintenance period. This does not say that central 
bankers are not concerned about interbank rates, to the contrary. But during a turmoil, there is less weight 
being put by policy makers on the relative likelihood of reaching the upper or lower end of the corridor on 
the last day of the maintenance period, compared to achieving a sufficiently generous liquidity provision 
during the maintenance period. Introducing these two changes to our model, i.e., a larger L* and a larger 
ȝ, indifference curves of the central bank become steeper, so it will often be optimal to choose the 
liquidity refill. These considerations suggest that the trade-off between liquidity and interest-rate 
smoothing is relevant also for a market under stress. 
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2)0()0(,0  LXXD bBbB P .
Thus, if 
 2
2
)0(
)(




 !
LX
rr
b
B
L
PP ,
one obtains 
  2)()0(,0 ! rrXD LbB .
Clearly, the parameter P  is finite because ! LX bB )0(  by Proposition 2. On the other 
hand,
  2)(0)(,  rrXXXD LbAbBbA .
Hence, by the continuity of (.)G , and by the intermediate value theorem, if P  is not too 
small, there exists an );0( bAA XX 
  satisfying (12). 
Step 2. Let );0(  AXH . Assume that H

AA XX . By Proposition 3, we know that 
)()( 1 ABAB XXXX !
 . We have to show that H )()( 1 ABAB XXXX . To provoke a 
contradiction, we assume 
Ht )()( 1 ABAB XXXX .            (13) 
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The idea will be to show that under condition (13), the allotment )( AB XX
  would be 
dominated by the benchmark allotment. Note first that from (13), 
  Ht  LXXXL ABA )(, . 
Thus, using the optimality of )( AB XX
 , we have 
     
 
    22
121
)(,
)(,
)(,)(,
PHt
t
 



rXXXSr
XXXD
XXXDrXXXSr
ABA
ABA
ABAABA
.
This implies 
    222 )()(, PHd  rrrXXXSr LABA .         (14) 
In step 5 of the proof, we will determine a value 0!AV  such that (14) cannot hold for 
distributions (.)G  with a standard deviation d AA VV .
Step 3. We continue to consider the case H AA XX . We show first that 
 )()( ABAA
b
BA XXXXXX
 t .           (15) 
Indeed, otherwise we had by Proposition 2 that 
  LXXXLXXX ABAA
b
BA )()(0 .         (16) 
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On the other hand, we have 
   )(,)(, 11 ABAABA XXXSXXXSS !!  ,
and therefore 
        rXXXSrrXXXSr ABAABA )(,)(,0 11 .        (17) 
Inequalities (16) and (17) imply that 
   
 
   
  ,)(,
)(,
)(
)(
)()(,
1
21
2
2
2
ABA
ABA
L
A
b
BA
ABAABA
XXXD
rXXXSr
rr
LXXX
LXXXXXXD
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t




P
P
contradicting the optimality of )( AB XX
 . This proves (15), and therefore 
 )()(  d A
b
BAAAB XXXXXX .
Hence, taking account of    SXXXS AbBA )(, , we find that 
  H)())(()(, ABAAABABA ttSXXttSXXXS d  .
Using (2) yields 
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 H)()(, 1 ABDL
L
ABA tt
rr
rr
GRXXXS ¸¸¹
·
¨¨©
§



 .         (18) 
In order to proceed, we will need an auxiliary result from probability theory which we 
state and prove in the subsequent step for lack of a suitable reference. 
Step 4. Let )1;0(D  and 0!E  such that 
DEV  1A .             (19) 
We claim then that 
^ `
DVE
VED

dd 
1
)(
~
2
1
A
AGApr ,          (20) 
which will be seen to be a one-sided inequality of the Chebyshev type for deviations 
from the Į percentile. To prove the claim, note that from Chebyshev's inequality (see, 
e.g., Loeve 1963), 
> @ D
D
V
d
¿
¾
½
¯
®
­

t 1
1
~~ AAEApr .
But then also 
> @ D
D
V
d
¿
¾
½
¯
®
­

t 1
1
~~ AAEApr .
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Thus, an upper bound for the D  percentile relative to the mean can be given by 
> @
D
VD

d
1
~
)(1 AAEG .
Applied to the above problem, this implies 
^ ` > @
> @ ,
1
~~
1
~~
)(
~ 1
¿
¾
½
¯
®
­

dd
¿
¾
½
¯
®
­


ddd 
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A
A
AEApr
AEAprGApr
where we have used assumption (19). Applying Chebychev's inequality another time 
proves the claim. 
Step 5. Combining (18) and (20), we get 
  
DVE
V

 
1
)(,0
2
A
A
ABA RXXXSG ,         (21) 
where )()( DLL rrrr  D and 0)( ! HE AB tt . Thus, if 0oAV , then also the 
right-hand side of (21) goes to zero. From 
   )(1)()( 1 RSGrrrSr DL    D ,
we see that 
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 22 )()(,  o rrrXXXSr LABA
for 0oAV . Thus, there exists 0!

AV  such that for all distributions given by (.)G
with standard deviation d AA VV , we have that (14) is not satisfied. For these 
distributions, condition (13) implies a contradiction, so that we have shown the first part 
of the proposition. 
Step 6. Consider now allotments H! AA XX . We wish to show that 
H! )()( A
b
BAB XXXX . As above, to provoke a contradiction, we assume 
Hd )()( A
b
BAB XXXX .            (22) 
The idea is to show that in this case, the allotment )( AB XX
  would be dominated by the 
benchmark allotment. Indeed, from (22) and (2), 
 
.)()(
)()(,
1 HD
H
B
BABA
tTG
tTRSRXXXS
 
d


Applying inequality (20), we find 
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
d
1'
)(,
2
A
A
ABA RXXXSG ,
where HE )(' BtT  . As in Step 5, this implies that 
      22 )()(,)(,  ot rrrXXXSrXXXD LABAABA         (23) 
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for 0oAV . On the other hand, 
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so that 
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contradicting (23), given that )( AB XX
  has been assumed to be optimal. This proves the 
second part of the proposition. Ƒ
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Figure 1. Autonomous factors. The figure shows the cumulative distribution function 
of the empirical distribution of unanticipated autonomous liquidity factor shocks 
(liquidity absorbing) in the euro area between the last operation and the end of the 
reserve maintenance period. The data set covers the periods ending in the months July 
2000 through January 2004. 
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Figure 2. Time structure of liquidity supply. There are two tenders at times tA and tB
that provide liquidity to the banking system. The central bank credit allotted in these 
operations remains outstanding until the end of the reserve accounting period. 
Operations before tA are not modeled explicitly, but represented by the liquidity 
aggregate S0. Central bank credit allotted in these earlier operations is assumed to 
mature before tB.
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Figure 3. Feasibility following underbidding. The benchmark allotment implements 
the interest rate target, but misses the liquidity target. In contrast, the liquidity refill 
implements the liquidity target, but misses the interest rate target. The optimal allotment 
is close to the benchmark allotment for weaker underbidding and essentially equal to the 
liquidity refill for stronger underbidding. 
